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The US Civil War provides researchers a unique opportunity to identify wartime leaders and thus to
test theories of leadership.  By observing both leaders and followers during the war and forty years
after it, I establish that the most able became wartime leaders, that leading by example from the front
was an effective strategy in reducing desertion rates, and that leaders later migrated to the larger cities
because this is where their superior skills would have had the highest pay-offs.  I find that US cities
were magnets for the most able and provided training opportunities for both leaders and followers:
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Carlyle (1840: 3)
A favorite quotation of the many web sites devoted to leadership is, “Real leaders are ordinary
men with extraodinary determination.”1 Prior generations celebrated both the superior cognitive
and non-cognitive skills of leaders. Carlyle (1840: 3) wrote of “Great Men.” Galton (1869: 141),
in discussing military leaders, wrote of men “excelling in many particulars,” including energy,
political capacity, charisma, intellect, and will. A heirarchical organization such as the military
or a ﬁrm should assign the “real leaders” to the highest ranking positions so that their reach is
stretched over a larger reach of the organization’s activities (Rosen 1992). But, as Galton (1869:
143) recognized, the incentives may not always be there. In times of peace or during short wars,
political patronage may determine military positions. A ﬁrm with monopoly power may dissipate
its rents on poor managers. The difﬁculty facing researchers on leadership is that it is hard to
identify the real leaders – non-cognitive skills are hard to measure and an observed leader may not
necessarily have achieved his position through superior skills.
This paper uses data on Union Army soldiers to test theories of leadership. It examines the
characteristics of men who were promoted to leadership positions and looks at what made leaders
effective. It examines whether, after the war, leaders are found in the larger cities where their su-
perior decision making skills would have had the highest pay-off. I can thus establish that in the
American past cities were magnets for the skilled as they are today (Gould 2007). Because the
US Civil War was a prolonged war with civilians (largely self-taught) ﬁlling the ranks of commis-
sioned and non-commissionedofﬁcers, it providesa unique opportunityto identify the real leaders.
Because all records are in the public domain (unlike WWII records) and because I follow men for
40 years, I can determine whether wartime leaders became civilian leaders and where they move
after the war.
1The original source is unknown.
1A vast literature examines the traits of who becomes a leader, describes leadership styles, ana-
lyzes what makes leaders effective, and models the matching of leaders and organizations. Traits
that distinguish leaders from others include physical energy, intelligence (including social intelli-
gence) greater than that of the average follower, motivation,self-conﬁdence, and ﬂexibility (House
and Aditya 1997). Although an emphasis on personality characteristics suggests that leadership
is innate, if leaders are judges, experts, and co-ordinators (Hermalin 2007) or simply people who
make right decisions more often (Lazear 2010), leadership can be learned.
Game theoretic models of leader effectiveness have emphasized that one way to elicit effort
from followers is to lead by example (Hermalin 2007). The density and range of Civil War ﬁreams
made exposure suicidal and the leadership skills of great generals evolved with the technology, no
longer centering on leading charges or needless exposure to the line of ﬁre (Keegan 1987: 164-
234). Nonetheless, Civil War scholars have emphasized the importance of both non-commissioned
and commissioned ofﬁcers such as colonels or captains motivating troops by showing courage
under ﬂying bullets (McPherson 2007: 145-54 ; Linderman 1987: 44-45). Scholars have pointed
out that US ofﬁcers’ not sharing the danger in WWII became a cause for resentment (Linderman
1999: 197) and may have reduced the US Army’s tactical proﬁciency relative to the Wehrmacht
(Muth 2011).
Models of sorting explain the observed characteristics of leaders and their organizations. In
Lucas’s (1978) model, the largest ﬁrms have the best managers because as capital increases wages
rise relative to marginal managerial returns thus inducing marginal managers to become employ-
ees. Rosen (1982) showed that the more talented will sort to top positions in larger ﬁrms where
their greater talent ﬁlters through the entire ﬁrm through the recursive chain of command. Lazear
(2010) emphasizes not ﬁrm size but that the better leaders will sort to the highest variance indus-
tries because thisiswhere decisionmakinghas the highestpayoff. After the US CivilWar, decision
making should have had the highest payoff in the larger cities which offered greater diversity in
2manufacturing industries (the dominant economic activity) and higher wages (Kim 2006).
1 Ofﬁcers in the Civil War
Regiments, the basic unit of the Civil War Armies, were formed locally. The volunteer infantry
regiments consisted of ten companies, each containing roughly 100 men, commanded by a cap-
tain and two lieutenants. Each company had four sergeants, one of whom served as company ﬁrst
sergeant, a sergeant major, a quartermaster sergeant, a commisary sergeant, four corporals, a hos-
pital steward, two musicians, and one wagoneer. The commissioned ofﬁcers were often volunteer
ofﬁcers drawn from state militias, men of political signiﬁcance, or other prominent men in the
community. Sometimes the enlisted men elected their own ofﬁcers. Generally, state governors
appointed the state governor and the commissioned ofﬁcers selected the non-commissioned ofﬁ-
cers. After the ﬁrst major battles, state governors began to commission ofﬁcers from the ranks of
noncommissioned ofﬁcers who had proved themselves in the ﬁeld and in battle (Fisher, Jr. 1994:
109). Among Ohio companies, the major predictors of promotion to non-commissioned ofﬁcer
were a non-farm and non-laborer occupation and literacy (Lee 1999).
Commissioned and non-commissioned ofﬁcers performed all ﬁve of the leadership activities
deﬁned by Hermalin (2007): they served as judges, experts, co-ordinators, symbols, and shapers of
preferences. Ofﬁcers had to judge men for absences without leave, crimes, and desertion; they had
to become experts in military tactics (both commissioned and non-commissioned ofﬁcers would
take lessons nightly studying from various training manuals); they had to ensure that their men
had adequate supplies, they had to ﬁle reports, and in the ﬁeld they had to maintain unit direction
and cadence and see to it that the men ﬁred upon order; the regimental color bearer (a sergeant)
was the rallying point for the men in the regiment (and the regimental ﬂag enabled regimental and
division ofﬁcers to see where a regiment was in a battle); and, the colonel was supposed to have
3“a personal acquaintance with every ofﬁcer and man” (Sherman 1891: 385). Ofﬁcer positions
required not just technical skills but also people skills. Samuel Pryce whose longest war service
was as the regimental adjunct wrote, “The details made by the sergeant major, the distribution
of clothing by the Q-M sergeant, and the dispensation of food by the commissary sergeant were
positions requiring the highest skill and tact, to avoid complaints” (Pryce 2008: 32).
Ofﬁcers could not expect to enforce their will on their men. Men who elected their own ofﬁcers
could just as easily dismiss them. Ofﬁcers who commanded contempt because of their cowardice
or disregard for the welfare of their men resigned their commissions, driven out by their men’s ill
will. When John Beatty, lieutenant colonel of the Third Ohio, began to court martial men who left
camp without leave, he faced “not only the hatred and curses of the soldiers tried and punished
but in some instances the ill will of their fathers, who for years were my neighbors and friends.”
He only aggravated insubordination as men extended their absences, refused to drill, and signed
petitions demanding his resignation (Linderman 1987: 41). He later gained the regiment’s respect
when at Perryville he ordered his men to the ground while he remained standing under “shot, shell,
and canister ... thick as hail” (Linderman 1987: 44-45).
Ofﬁcers were paid more than enlisted men and lived in different quarters in the same camp
(Smith 2003). At the start of the war infantry privates and corporals were paid $13 a month,
sergeants $17, ﬁrst sergeants $20, and lieutenants and captains over $100 (Boatner 1991: 624).
Privates in an army camp were grouped by company. There were separate rows for the non-
comissioned ofﬁcers, commissioned ofﬁcers of the companies, and the staff and commander of the
regiment, who were located in front of the baggage train. Ofﬁcers used their own funds to purchase
food and ate at separate messes from the men. The latrines for ofﬁcers were behind the baggage
train whereas those for enlisted men were at the opposite end of the camp. Smith (2003) ﬁnds
disease death rates of 65.4 per 1000 for enlisted men in New York Regiments compared to 23 per
thousand for their commissioned ofﬁcers. Lee (1999) ﬁnds that in a sample of Ohio companies
4four percent of non-commissioned ofﬁcers died of disease compared to 9 percent of privates.
2 Economic Framework
The military is an internal labor market with few ports of entry and with promotion largely from
within (Rosen 1992). In a strongly heirarchical organization with a chain of command structure, it
is efﬁcient to assign the most able individuals to the highest ranking and most inﬂuential positions
in the organization because their reach is stretched over a larger portion of the organization’s activ-
ities. Selection of personnel to the highest ranks is thus more important than selection to the lower
ranks. Because talent is revealed only slowly and because advancement depends on the number
of available positions, the promotion mechanism is an elimination tournament. The reward for
any given rank is the weighted sum of rewards attained at all ranks higher than the current rank,
with weights depending on the conditional probability of surviving to compete at those higher
levels. Because competition is tougher at each step, the earnings structure has to give more than
proportionally greater awards to those who achieve higher rank.
Both commissioned and non-commissioned ofﬁcers should have been more skilled than pri-
vates prior to joining the army and the more skilled should achieve higher ranks. Promotion
should depend on the demand for ofﬁcers which will in turn depend on how much action the
regiment saw. Both ofﬁcers and non-commissioned ofﬁcers should have more privileges than en-
listed men. Because these privileges meant different food and separate quarters and because of the
strong relationship between sanitation and disease in the nineteenth century, ofﬁcers should face a
lower probability of death from disease. Unless monetary compensation was very high they should
also face a lower overall risk of death.
Ofﬁcers might lead by example to signal to their followers that victory is achievable or that
the risk of death is not high. Hermalin (2007) shows that in a game theoretic model in which the
5leader’s actions reveal the true state of nature to the follower, the harder the leader works the harder
the followers work. If the leader’s actions do not fully reveal the state and their payoff depends on
the efforts of other team members, followers will mimic the leader whereas they would not if they
knew the true state (Komai et al. 2007). With perfect mimicry, the battleﬁeld mortality of ofﬁcers
and privates will be similar, though going ﬁrst will increase mortality. The non-commissioned
ofﬁcers who were regimental ﬂag-bearers should have a higher mortality rate than privates because
they were good targets. Ofﬁcers’ battleﬁeld mortality could be lower or higher than that of enlisted
men if, on average, men do not follow or ofﬁcers do not lead by example.
Leading by example can be efﬁcient (see the review by Hermalin 2007). If it is an effective
strategy then desertion rates (which averaged ten percent for the Union Army) should be lower for
companies where a higher fraction of ofﬁcers relative to enlisted men were killed controlling for
the death rate.
How successfully military training can be transferred to the civilian sector remains an open
question. Military training could develop skills such as discipline or leadership. It could also have
provided familiarity with logistics. Descriptions of the strengths of Grant’s leadership and of the
management of the modern ﬁrm are similar.2 Although military service on average has a negative
causal effect on earnings (Angrist 1990), Benmelech and Frydman (2009) ﬁnd that military service
has a causal effect on managerial decisions and ﬁrm outcomes. Even if military training has no
effect on later outcomes, if military leaders are the most able they will become the civilian leaders.
The most able (those who become ofﬁcers) should sort to where their abilities have the greatest
pay-offs. Thus they will be in larger cities, which may have fostered the division of labor, and
in higher status occupations after the war. Lee (2006) ﬁnds that former non-commissioned and
2Grant used the telegraph “to collect intelligence, summon reinforcements, rapidly redispose [their] forces, and
co-ordinate the movement of widely separated formations.” “He valued objective information highly and collected
it from many sources ... Rivers and railroads were the means by which Grant brought his armies to the battleﬁeld,
spies, scouts and telegraph the media through which he informed himself of the enemy’s own movements” (Keegan
1987:210-221). Grant was not able to transfer his skills to the private sector and was a notoriously bad business man.
6commissioned ofﬁcers were more likely to move upward in status to a white collar occupation by
1880 than privates, but did not look at where men migrated. Moving to a large city may have
opened up opportunities even for men who had to start in lower status occupations. If the more
able leaders are also generalists (Lazear 2010), then the ofﬁcers who had different types of duties
during the war will be more likely to be in larger cities than those who had only type of duty.
3 Econometric Framework
I examine whether ofﬁcers were more able by looking at the predictors of time in months from
muster until ﬁrst promotion to commissioned ofﬁcer, sergeant, and corporal. That is, I estimate a
Weibull hazard model of the form
h(t)=h0(t)exp(βx(X) (1)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard and X is a vector of characteristics including height, personal
property ownership in 1860, literacy in 1860, marital status in 1860, nativity, occupation at enlist-
ment (professional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the omitted cate-
gory), dummies for enlistment year, age at muster, volunteer status, the logarithm of population in
city of enlistment, and whether the regiment was in the past under ﬁre, a measure of promotion
possibilities.
I investigate the survivorship privileges of being an ofﬁcer by running Weibull hazard models
of months until death from muster
h(t)=h0(t)exp(βc(Corporal)+βs(Sergeant)+βo(Commissioned Ofﬁcer)+βxX) (2)
h(t)=h0(t)exp(βso(Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer)+βxX) (3)
7where h0(t) is the baseline hazard and control variables include height, personal property owner-
ship in 1860, literacy in 1860, marital status in 1860, nativity, occupation at enlistment (profes-
sional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the omitted category), dummies
for enlistment year, age at muster, volunteer status, and the logarithm of population in city of en-
listment. Men who desert, become POWs, or are discharged are treated as censored. I examine
both time until death from all causes and time until death from disease and wounds. My regres-
sions for wounds also control for whether or not an ofﬁcer position was a front-line position (e.g.
a quarter-master was not).
If the men who become ofﬁcers are also the healthier men or the men more knowledgeable
in disease prevention, I may overestimate the beneﬁcial effect of being an ofﬁcer on the risk of
death from disease. I may understate if these men had fewer immunities because they were from
healthier areas. If the men who become ofﬁcers are the most gung-ho, I will overestimate the
negative effects of being an ofﬁcer on risk of death in battle. I will understate if men who became
ofﬁcers were seeking safety. Unfortunately I cannot statistically correct for endogeneity because
predictors of promotion to ofﬁcer such total casualties also determine death, including death from
disease. Birth year dummies (those born later did not serve a full three year term and thus did not
have as many chances to become ofﬁcers) were weak instruments.
I estimate the effectiveness of leading from the front by estimatingOLS regressions of the form
Company Desertion Rate = βr(
No of ofﬁcers killed+.01
No of men killed +.01
)+
βd(Company Death Rate in Battle)+
βo(Company Characteristics)+u (4)
where each observation is a company, the ratio of commissioned ofﬁcers to enlisted men killed in
battle is on the regiment level, and company characteristics include the fraction of the company
8who were volunteers, the coefﬁcient of variation of age for the company, company occupational
fragmentation, birth place fragmentation, and the mean 1860 percent vote for Lincoln in the county
of enlistment.
I examine the effects of having been an ofﬁcer on city of residence in both 1880 and 1900 by
estimating probit equations for each year of the form
C = βc(Corporal)+βs(Sergeant)+βoCommissioned Ofﬁcer + βaX (5)
C = βso(Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer)+βxX (6)
and ordered probit equations of the form
CS = βso(Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer)+βxX (7)
where C is equal to one if the veteran lived in a city of at least 25,000 people in 1880 or 1900 and
CS is a categorical variable with city size categories of 25,0000 or more, 2500-24,999, and less
than 2500 or unincorporated in 1900. X is a vector of socioeconomicand demographic characteris-
tics, including height at enlistment, personal property ownership in 1860, literacy in 1860, marital
status in 1860, nativity, occupation at enlistment (professional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and
unknown, with farmer as the omitted category), dummies for enlistment year, age at muster, vol-
unteer status, dummies for population size in city of enlistment, and dummies for 1880 occupation
in the 1900 speciﬁcation. If ofﬁcers are the most able, whether innately or because of what they
have learned on the job, they should move to a larger city.
I similarly measure the effects of having been an ofﬁcer on later life socioeconomic outcomes
by estimating probit equations of the form
S = βc(Corporal)+βs(Sergeant)+βoCommissioned Ofﬁcer + βaX (8)
9S = βso(Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer)+βxX (9)
where S is variously an indicator of whether the veteran was a professional or proprietor circa
1900, a home owner in 1900, and a professional or proprietor in 1880.
I examine the simultaneous choice of city size and occupation by estimating multinomial logit
models for both 1880 and 1900 in which my categories are 1) in a city of 2,500 or more and a
professional or proprietor; 2) in a city of 2,500 and not a professional or proprietor; 3) not in a city
of 2,500 and a professional or proprietor; and, 4) not in city of 2,500 or more and not a professional
or proprietor. That is, I estimate
Pr(Category i)=βso(Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer)+βxX (10)
where X is in an indicator of a vector of pre-enlistment and enlistment demographic and socioeco-
nomic characteristics.
4 Data
My sample is based on the army records of roughly 35,000 white men in 303 volunteer infantry
Union Army regiment.3 These records provide basic socioeconomic and demographic informa-
tion at enlistment and record muster-in and muster-out information, promotions and demotions,
furloughs, AWOLs, desertions, captures, wounds, illnesses, and death. Information on the 1860
population of incorporated place of enlistment was added. Military records were collected for all
enlisted men within one of the randomly chosen companies. The commissioned ofﬁcers in the
sample are therefore predominately those who rose from the ranks. I added information whether
the regiment was under ﬁre in a speciﬁc month from the regimental histories collected as part of
3The data were collected as part of the NIA funded project, Early Indicators of Later Work Levels, Disease and
Death (P01AG10120),Robert Fogel, PI. The data are available at http://www.cpe.uchicago.edu.
10this project.
After the military records were entered into the database, pension records, including detailed
physical examinations, were collected. The pension records provide information on occupation,
names of family members, and death. The information in the pension records and in the army
records is then used to link recruits to the 1850, 1860, 1900, and 1910 censuses. Linkage to the
1860 census indicates that the sample is representative not just of the Union Army but also of the
northern population of military age in terms of literacy and wealth. I will use information from the
1860 census on personal property ownership, literacy, and marital status and from the 1900 census
on place of residence and occupation. I used the published tables from the 1900 census to obtain
information on population of the incorporated place. I also use the linkage to the 1880 census done
by Costa and Kahn (2007). This linkage only uses information in the military service records.4 I
added population on city of residence from the published tables of the 1880 census.
I restrict my analyses to men with complete wartime information on desertion, death, and
discharge, leaving me with 34,941 men. When examining the effects of rank on mortality I restrict
the sample to the 27,545 men with complete date information on all rank changes and who were
not commissioned ofﬁcers when they joined the company. When I examine men in 1880 and 1900,
I am using 5,464 and 10,756 observations, respectively.5
My analysis of the effectiveness of leading from the front uses the 300 companies for whom I
have information on the regimental battleﬁeld mortality rate of ofﬁcers and enlistment men from
Dyer’s A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion. I calculated company desertion rates, the frac-
tion of the company dead from wounds, the fraction of the company dead of disease, the fraction
of the company who were volunteers, the coefﬁcient of variation of age for the company, company
occupational fragmentation, company birth place fragmentation, and the mean 1860 percent vote
4For a discussion of linkage rates see Costa and Kahn (2007).
5More men are linked to the 1900 census than to the 1880 census because using the pension information leads to a
better match.
11for Lincoln in the county of enlistment using individual level data on the 34,941 men.
Table 1 shows variable means for all 34,941 men (or those linked to the censuses) by highest
rank achieved. The literate, the native-born, professionals or proprietors and artisans, volunteers,
and those who volunteered earlier are more likely to become ofﬁcers. Those who became com-
missioned ofﬁcers are less likely to have died during the war but this may simply be because only
those who survived longer were at risk of being commissioned. After the war, ofﬁcers were more
likely to be professional or proprietors and were living in larger cities.
5 Results
5.1 Creating Leaders
Table 2 shows that the more able were more likely to become ofﬁcers, i.e. men who were more lit-
erate and men who were either professionals or proprietors or artisans. The tall were more likely to
become ofﬁcers, as were the native-born. Size of city of enlistment did not matter. Volunteer status
predicted becoming a corporal but was not a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of being promoted
to either sergeant or ofﬁcer. Controlling for year of enlistment and other characteristics of men at
enlistment, having the regiment be under ﬁre in the past was a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of
promotion. Being under ﬁre in the past month predicted promotion to sergeant and corporal and
being under ﬁre two months ago predicted promotion to commissioned ofﬁcer, probably because
of the time it took to obtain a commission.
Promotion to commissioned ofﬁcer sharply lowered the odds of death relative to a private from
both disease and wounds (see Table 3). Promotion to corporal or sergeant lowered the odds of
death relative to a private from disease but raised the odds of death from wounds. Overall risk of
death relativeto a privatewas lower. The estimated duration dependence parameter for the weibull,
p, was 0.924 (ˆ σ2=.018) for death from disease and 1.191 (ˆ σ2=0.045) for death in battle, implying
12that men’s risk of death from disease fell with their time in the army (perhaps as they developed
immunities) but that their risk of death from wounds rose.
For comparison, the ﬁnal column of Table 3 gives results for all causes of death for a sample
of roughly 6,000 colored troops. These were led by white commissioned ofﬁcers and by black
corporals and sergeants. Because 90 percent of black wartime deaths were from disease, overall
mortality is effectively disease mortality. The higher the rank the lower the relative risk of death.
5.2 Leader Effectiveness
Although on average commissioned ofﬁcers did not imperil themselves in battle, when they did, it
was an effective strategy in creating a cohesive ﬁghting unit. At the regiment level, the mean ratio
of ofﬁcers to enlisted men killed was 0.169 with a standard deviation of 0.333. Company desertion
rates, which averaged 11 percent, were lower for companies in which the regimental battleﬁeld
mortality of commissioned ofﬁcers relative to enlisted men was higher (see Table 4), controlling
for the fraction of men in the company dying of wounds and of disease. The results persist when
I control for proxies for commitment to the cause such as the strength of the vote for Lincoln in
the county of enlistment or volunteer status and for proxies for cohesiveness such as the coefﬁcient
of variation of age, occupational fragmentation, and birth place fragmentation (see the last two
columns).6 A standard deviation increase in the mean ratio of ofﬁcers to enlisted men killed would
have lowered desertion rates by 0.014. In contrast, desertion rates would have fallen by 0.008
with a standard deviation increase in the fraction of the company who were volunteers, by 0.012
with a standard deviation decrease in birthplace fragmentation, by 0.033 with a standard deviation
increase in the percent of the county voting for Lincoln, and by 0.044 with a standard deviation
decrease in occupational fragmentation. I ﬁnd no evidence of non-linearities in the effect of the
ratio of ofﬁcers to enlisted men killed on desertion rates (results not shown). The ratio of deaths
6See Costa and Kahn (2003) for the effects of company characteristics on desertion rates and details on how the
fragmentation indices were calculated.
13from disease of ofﬁcers relative to enlisted men had no effect on desertion rates (see the second
column of Table 4), either because sick men could not desert or because the connection between
ofﬁcers’ better food and quarters and their lower risk of death from disease was not well known.
5.3 Are Leaders in Larger Cities?
In 1880 former sergeants and commissioned ofﬁcers were more likely to be in cities of 25,000
or more relative to privates (see Table 5), controlling for characteristics at enlistment, including
enlistment occupation and size of city of enlistment. A former sergeant was 1.7 times as likely as a
former private to be in a city of 25,000 or more while a former commissioned ofﬁcer was 2.8 times
as likely. When I look at the combined category of former sergeant or commissioned ofﬁcer, these
men were twice as likely to be in a city of 25,000 or more. When I control for occupation in 1880,
these men were still 1.9 times as likely to be in a city of 25,000 or more.
Former sergeants and commissioned ofﬁcers were not just more likely than former privates to
be in large cities, they were also more likely to be in intermediate size cities. They were twice as
likely as former privates to be in cities of 25,000 or more and 1.2 to 1.7 times as likely to be in
cities of 2,500 to 24,999 (see Table 5).
Former sergeants and commissioned ofﬁcers were more likely to have moved across counties
between 1860 and 1880 (results not shown). The fraction of county movers was 0.59 and being a
former sergeant raised the probability of a move relative to a private by 0.055 (ˆ σ2=0.031). Being
a former commissioned ofﬁcer raised the probability of a move by 0.102 (ˆ σ2= 0.052). Conditional
on being a county mover, there was not a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between distance
moved and wartime rank and the sign of the coefﬁcient on former commissioned ofﬁcer implies
that former ofﬁcers were less likely to move long distances. Former sergeants were statistically
signiﬁcantly more likely to have moved across states but not former commissioned ofﬁcers. The
results are consistent with a move to large cities rather than with a westward migration.
14Examining size of city of residence and wartime rank in 1900 yields similar but slightly atten-
uated results (see Table 6), controlling for enlistment characteristics and 1880 occupation. Cor-
porals, sergeants, and commissioned ofﬁcers were more likely to be in a city of 25,000 or more
relative to privates, with stronger effects for commissioned ofﬁcers. For the combined category of
former sergeant or commissioned ofﬁcer, these men were 1.3 times as likely to be in city of 25,000
or more relative to privates. They were 1.2 times as likely to be in a city of 2,500 to 24,999.
Former sergeantsand commissionedofﬁcers were more likelytobe professionalsor proprietors
in 1880 and 1900 and former corporals were also more likely to be professionals or proprietors
circa 1900 (see Table 7). Men in the combined category of former sergeant or commissioned
ofﬁcer were 1.7 to 1.8 times as likely to be professionals or proprietors relative to privates.
In both 1880 and 1900 having been a sergeant or commissioned ofﬁcer raised a veteran’s prob-
ability of 1) living in a city of 2,500 or more and being a professional or proprietor; 2) living in
city of 2,500 or more and not being a professional or proprietor; and, 3) not living in city of 2,500
or more and being a professional or proprietor (see Table 8). Relative to the mean probability
of living in a city of 2,500 or more and being a professional or proprietor, having been a former
sergeant or commissioned ofﬁcer roughly doubled the joint probability of living in a city of 2,500
or more and being a professional or proprietor.
Cities may have provided training opportunities for the able. (Because of sorting on ability, a
random veteran would not necessarily beneﬁt from being in a city.) Veterans who were in a city
of 2,500 or more in 1880 and were not professionals or proprietors in 1880 were more likely to be
professionals and proprietors in 1900 (see Table 9).
The movement of ofﬁcers to large cities did not lead former privates and corporals to follow
them (results not shown). The 298 former sergeants or commissioned ofﬁcers in cities or boroughs
in 1900 were more likely to be in city of 25,000 or more if there was a fellow ofﬁcers in that
same city (the derivative of the probit coefﬁcient was 0.366 with a standard error of 0.091), but
15the number of former privates or corporals did not predict former sergeants and ofﬁcers being in a
large city. In contrast, the 1661 former privates or corporals in cities in 1900 were more likely to
be in city of 25,000+ if there was an enlisted man in that city (the derivate on the probit coefﬁcient
was 0.327 with a standard error of 0.039) but not if there was a former sergeant or ofﬁcer in that
city.
5.4 Leaders as Generalists
There is suggestive evidence sergeants and ofﬁcers with more than strict military tasks while in the
army were more likely to be in a city of 25,000 or more in 1880 (results not shown), consistent
with Lazear’s (2010) theory of leaders as generalists. I classiﬁed different tasks as being a quarter-
master, being on recruiting duty, being a clerk, being a nurse, etc. if veteran was ever in a front-
line position. I do not consider being on guard duty a different type of task nor do I consider a
promotion to be a different type of task. Relative to privates sergeants with only one type of task
had only a 0.014 (ˆ σ2=0.012) greater probability of being in a large city, but those with more than
one task had a 0.079 (ˆ σ2=0.034) greater probability. Commissioned ofﬁcers with only one type of
task had a 0.056 (ˆ σ2=0.037) greater probability of being in a large city compared to one of 0.156
(ˆ σ2=0.077) for ofﬁcers with more than one type of task. However, having more than one type of
task may proxy not for being a generalist but having for the chance to acquire skills that were more
transferable to the private sector (Lee 2006). When I classiﬁed the combined category of sergeants
or commissioned ofﬁcers as having one, two, and three or more tasks, I found suggestive but not
statistically signiﬁcant evidence of decreasing returns.
166 Conclusion
The Civil War provides researchers a unique opportunityto identify wartime leaders. By observing
both leaders and followers during the war and forty years after it, I established that the most able
became wartime leaders, that leading by example from the front was an effective strategy in reduc-
ing desertion rates, and that leaders later migrated to the larger cities because this is where their
superior skills would have had the highest pay-offs. My ﬁndings support theories of leadership
based on personnel economics such as those of Lazear (2010).
My ﬁndings also have implications for the growth of US cities. The literature on internal
migration has emphasized the westward movement, but at the same time that the population was
moving westward the share of the urban population (those living in a city of at least 2500) rose
from 20 to 40 percent between 1860 and 1900. Cities were magnets for the most able (the leaders).
They also provided training opportunities for both leaders and followers: men might start in a low
social status occupation in a city but then move to a higher status occupation.
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19Table 1: Characteristics of Men by Highest Rank Achieved
Private or Commissioned
Support Corporal Sergeant Ofﬁcer
Dummy=1 if has personal property in 1860 0.699 0.698 0.676 0.700
Dummy=1 if married in 1860 0.331 0.297 0.314 0.399
Dummy=1 if illiterate 0.045 0.016 0.010 0.012
Dummy=1 if Native-born 0.733 0.796 0.800 0.846
Irish 0.092 0.066 0.077 0.041
German 0.079 0.058 0.049 0.054
British 0.039 0.041 0.038 0.032
Other 0.058 0.039 0.036 0.027
Age at muster 25.784 25.164 25.837 26.459
Height in inches 67.435 68.075 68.456 68.554
Population in 1860 in enlistment place 64,404.030 53,318.420 76,581.600 64,852.090
Dummy=1 if farmer 0.516 0.520 0.428 0.350
Professional or proprietor 0.189 0.226 0.275 0.257
Artisan 0.064 0.085 0.122 0.247
Laborer 0.226 0.161 0.164 0.103
Unknown 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.043
Dummy=1 if mustered in 1861 0.189 0.270 0.324 0.350
1862 0.324 0.426 0.420 0.466
1863 0.073 0.049 0.048 0.043
1864 0.280 0.174 0.145 0.095
1865 0.134 0.080 0.063 0.046
Dummy=1 if volunteer 0.894 0.962 0.976 0.985
Dummy=1 if died in the war 0.140 0.129 0.120 0.056
Population in 1880 city of residence 20,229.520 20,738.400 37,602.180 51,787.690
Population in 1900 city of residence 96,883.030 94,386.460 166,247.600 176,386.800
Dummy=1 if farmer in 1880 0.432 0.434 0.381 0.220
Professional or proprietor 0.123 0.117 0.208 0.336
Artisan 0.180 0.220 0.206 0.253
Laborer 0.237 0.197 0.182 0.154
Dummy=1 if farmer c. 1900 0.740 0.681 0.592 0.469
Professional or proprietor 0.261 0.281 0.359 0.566
Artisan 0.417 0.398 0.447 0.389
Laborer 0.514 0.369 0.357 0.235
Dummy=1 if home owner in 1900 0.601 0.667 0.607 0.636
Obs 28,255 3,138 2,573 975
20Table 2: Odds Ratio of Probability of Promotion
Time (in Months) Until
Commissioned
Ofﬁcer Sergeant Corporal
Regimental casualties current month 1.002 1.001 0.998
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
Regimental casualties one month ago 1.005 1.014‡ 1.014‡
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Regimental casualties two months ago 1.012‡ 0.0984∗ 0.988
(0.003) (0.008) (0.009)
Regimental casualties three months ago 0.989
(0.014)
Age at muster 1.029† 0.992 0.985∗
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
Height in inches 1.124‡ 1.153‡ 1.066‡
(0.035) (0.027) (0.024)
Dummy=1 if has personal property in 1860 1.169 0.876 0.751∗
(0.356) (0.155) (0.115)
Dummy=1 if illiterate 0.000‡ 0.318∗ 0.474
(0.000) (0.208) (0.224)
Dummy=1 if Native-born 1.806∗ 1.098 1.357∗
(0.585) (0.192) (0.224)
Dummy=1 if volunteer 1.253 1.188 2.268∗
(0.684) (0.631) (1.117)
Logarithm(Population in City of Enlistment) 0.944 0.948 0.981
(0.060) (0.040) (0.038)
Dummy=1 if at enlistment farmer
Professional or proprietor 8.671‡ 4.951‡ 1.123
(2.164) (0.945) (0.265)
Artisan 2.344‡ 2.512‡ 1.774‡
(0.571) (0.415) (0.240)
Laborer 0.845 1.725‡ 1.240
(0.317) (0.332) (0.204)
Number of men 27,545 26,879 25,837
Number of promotions 122 295 446
The sample is restricted to men with complete information on all rank changes and dates of rank changes. Standard
errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company level. The symbols ∗, †, and ‡ indicate signiﬁcance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Additional control variables include enlistment year dummies, a dummy for
volunteerstatus, a dummyfor unknownoccupation,and a dummyindicating linkageto the 1860census. See Equation
1 in the text.
21Table 3: Odds Ratio of Probability of Wartime Death by Rank Relative to Private
White Troops USCT
Overall Disease Battle Overall
1. Hazard Model
Corporal 0.888‡ 0.727‡ 1.216† 0.697‡
(0.061) (0.066) (0.122) (0.093)
Sergeant 0.824‡ 0.535‡ 1.347‡ 0.320‡
(0.070) (0.071) (0.149) (0.064)
Commissioned Ofﬁcer 0.181‡ 0.079‡ 0.351‡ 0.188‡
(0.057) (0.057) (0.132) (0.051)
2. Hazard Model
Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer 0.688‡ 0.446‡ 1.101
(0.057) (0.057) (0.120)
The sample is restricted to men with complete information on all rank changes and dates of rank changes. Standard
errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company level. The symbols ∗, †, and ‡ indicate signiﬁcance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The speciﬁcation is Equations 2 and 3 in the text. Control variables include
height,personalpropertyownershipin 1860,literacyin 1860,marital status in1860,nativity,occupationat enlistment,
enlistment year dummies, age at muster, volunteer status, and the logarithm of population in city of enlistment.
22Table 4: Effect of Leading from the Front on Company Desertion Rates
Dependent Variable:
Mean Company Desertion Rate
No of ofﬁcers killed+.01
No of men killed +.01 in regiment 0.169 -0.044† -0.032∗ -0.042†
(0.332) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Fraction company dying of wounds 0.046 0.287∗ 0.394† 0.139 0.132
(0.041) (0.161) (0.155) (0.150) (0.144)
Fraction company dying of disease 0.091 -0.256‡ -0.204† 0.026 0.008
(0.008) (0.096) (0.095) (0.096) (0.094)
Fraction company volunteers 0.918 -0.066∗ -0.046
(0.173) (0.034) (0.033)
Company coefﬁcient of variation of age 3.583 -0.016 -0.024†
(0.453) (0.012) (0.012)
Company occupational fragmentation 0.541 0.230‡ 0.244‡
(0.184) (0.034) (0.033)
Company birth place fragmentation 0.632 0.067‡ 0.053†
(0.228) (0.025) (0.024)
No of ofﬁcers died disease +.01
No of men died disease +.01 in regiment 0.017 0.051
(0.059) (0.106)
1860 vote (%) for Lincoln in enlistment county 48.444 -0.002‡
(16.341) (0.000)
Constant 0.129‡ 0.111‡ 0.061 0.169‡
(0.014) (0.012) (0.062) (0.063)
Observations 300 300 300 291
R-squared 0.044 0.030 0.231 0.304
Each observation is a company. See Equation 4 in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the
company level. The symbols ∗, †, and ‡ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
23Table 5: Wartime Rank (Relative to Private) and Size of City of Residence in 1880
Probit Ordered Probit
Odds Ratios
City of 25,000+ City Population
Odds 2500- Diff-
∂P






Commissioned Ofﬁcer 0.063‡ 2.824‡
(0.024) (0.747)
2. Probit
Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer 0.032‡ 1.952‡
(0.009) (0.303)
With Occupation Category Controls
Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer 0.019‡ 1.911‡
(0.006) (0.360)
3. Ordered Probit
Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer 2.093‡ 1.682‡ 0.410‡
(0.292) (0.173) (0.127)
With Occupation Category Controls
Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer 2.127‡ 1.216‡ 0.910‡
(0.355) (0.411) (0.332)
The sample consists of the 5,464 men linked to the 1880 census. See Equations 5, 6, and 7 in the text. Standard errors
are in parentheses and are clustered at the company level. The symbols ∗, †, and ‡ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5,
and 1 percent level, respectively. The speciﬁcations control for height at enlistment, dummies for personal property
ownership, literacy, and marital status in 1860, nativity dummies (Britain, Ireland, Germany, other foreign, with US
as the omitted category), occupationat enlistment dummies (professional or proprietor,artisan, laborer, and unknown,
with farmer as the omitted category),enlistment year dummies, age at muster, a dummy for volunteer status, a dummy
for population size in city of enlistment, and a dummy indicating linkage to the 1860 census.
24Table 6: Wartime Rank (Relative to Private) and Size of City of Residence in 1900
Probit Ordered Probit
Odds Ratios
City of 25,000+ City Population
Odds 2500- Diff-
∂P






Commissioned Ofﬁcer 0.054‡ 1.508†
(0.024) (0.232)
2. Probit
Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer 0.031‡ 1.286‡
(0.011) 0.106)
3. Ordered Probit
Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer 1.335‡ 1.162† 0.174‡
(0.090) (0.044) (0.050)
The sample consists of the 10,756men linked to the 1900census. See Equations5, 6, and 7 in the text. Standarderrors
are in parentheses and are clustered at the company level. The symbols ∗, †, and ‡ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5,
and 1 percent level, respectively. The speciﬁcations control for height at enlistment, dummies for personal property
ownership, literacy, and marital status in 1860, nativity dummies (Britain, Ireland, Germany, other foreign, with US
as the omitted category), occupationat enlistment dummies (professional or proprietor,artisan, laborer, and unknown,
with farmer as the omitted category),enlistment year dummies, age at muster, a dummy for volunteer status, a dummy
for population size in city of enlistment, 1880 occupation dummies (professional or proprietor, artisan, and laborer,
with farmer as the omitted category), and dummies indicating linkage to the 1860 and 1880 censuses.
25Table 7: Wartime Rank (Relative to Private) and Socioeconomic Status in 1900 and 1880
Occupation c. 1900 Professional
is Professional or Proprietor







Corporal 0.027‡ 1.207† 0.053‡ 1.090‡ -0.010 0.914
(0.011) (0.086) (0.009) (0.027) (0.013) (0.104)
Sergeant 0.069‡ 1.542‡ 0.009 1.016 0.061‡ 1.530‡
(0.013) (0.114) (0.015) (0.026) (0.016) (0.154)
Commissioned Ofﬁcer 0.169‡ 2.343‡ 0.075‡ 1.128‡ 0.117‡ 2.005‡
(0.029) (0.267) (0.025) (0.044) (0.034) (0.318)
2. Probit
Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer 0.088‡ 1.692‡ 0.017 1.028 0.084‡ 1.750‡
(0.012) (0.111) (0.014) (0.023) (0.015) (0.159)
The samples consist of the 5,464 men linked to the 1880 census and the 10,756 men linked to the 1900 census. See
Equations 8 and 9 in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company level. The symbols
∗, †, and ‡ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The speciﬁcations control for height at
enlistment, dummies for personal property ownership, literacy, and marital status in 1860, nativity dummies (Britain,
Ireland, Germany, other foreign, with US as the omitted category), occupation at enlistment dummies (professional
or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the omitted category), enlistment year dummies, age at
muster, a dummy for volunteer status, a dummy for population size in city of enlistment, and a dummy indicating
linkage to the 1860 census. The 1900 speciﬁcations control for 1880 occupation dummies (professional or proprietor,
artisan, and laborer, with farmer as the omitted category) and a dummy indicating linkage to the 1880 census.
26Table 8: Former Sergeant or Commissioned Ofﬁcer (Relative to Former Private or Corporal) and
City Size and Occupation Choice in 1880 and 1900
1900 1880
Mean P ∂P
∂X Mean P ∂P
∂X
City of 2,500+ and professional/proprietor 0.029 0.024‡ 0.081 0.043‡
(0.006) (0.007)
City of 2,500 and not professional/proprietor 0.071 0.032‡ 0.193 0.021∗
(0.009) (0.012)
City of less than 2,500 and professional/proprietor 0.111 0.047‡ 0.082 0.033‡
City of less than 2,500 and not professional/proprietor 0.789 -0.103‡ 0.645 -0.097‡
(0.014) (0.014)
The samples consist of the 5,464 men linked to the 1880 census and the 10,756 men linked to the 1900 census. See
Equation 10 in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company level. The symbols ∗,
†, and ‡ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The speciﬁcations control for height at
enlistment, dummies for personal property ownership, literacy, and marital status in 1860, nativity dummies (Britain,
Ireland, Germany, other foreign, with US as the omitted category), occupation at enlistment dummies (professional
or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the omitted category), enlistment year dummies, age at
muster, a dummy for volunteer status, a dummy for population size in city of enlistment, and a dummy indicating
linkage to the 1860 census.
27Table 9: City Size and Occupation Choice in 1880 and Occupational Status in 1900
Private or Sergeant or
Dependent Variable: Corporal Commissioned Ofﬁcer





City of 2,500+ and professional/proprietor in 1880 0.397‡ 0.440‡
(0.062) (0.094)
City of 2,500+ and not professional/proprietor in 1880 0.051∗ 0.127∗
(0.030) (0.076)
Not city of 2,500+ and professional/proprietor in 1880 0.385‡ 0.468‡
(0.030) (0.056)
Mean P 0.148 0.297
Observations 2,932 501
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.127
The sample consists of all 3,433 men linked across the 1880 and 1900 censuses. Standard errors are in parentheses
and are clustered at the company level. The symbols ∗, †, and ‡ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,
respectively. All speciﬁcations control for age at enlistment.
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